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Antitrust
by Michael Eric Ross*
and
Jeffrey S. Cashdan"
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued seven antitrust decisions
in 1996.1 Only one opinion addressed substantive antitrust issues.
The others turned on procedural' or immunity grounds.4 Antitrust

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida (A.B.,
1971); Harvard University (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Claremont McKenna
College (B.A., 1987); University of Chicago (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bars of Georgia
and Illinois.
The views expressed in this Article are the personal opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of King & Spalding, or any of its clients.
1. Slagle v. ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494 (11th Cir. 1996); Crosby v. Hospital Auth., 93
F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1246 (1997); Kotam Elecs., Inc. v. JBL
Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946
(1997); Uniforce Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc.,
87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996); Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 84
F.3d 1388 (11th Cir. 1996); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d
1560, modified on re'g, 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996); Levine v. Central Fla. Med.
Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 75 (1996).
2. Levine, 72 F.3d 1538.
3. Katam Elecs., 93 F.3d 724 (overruling Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974), and
holding that arbitration agreements concerning domestic antitrust claims are enforceable);
Aquatherm Indus., 84 F.3d 1388 (holding that a Florida court judgment on a state antitrust
law claim did not preclude subsequent federal court action on a federal antitrust claim
arising from same facts).
4. Slagle, 102 F.3d 494 (holding Florida windstorm insurers immune under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act); Crosby, 93 F.3d 1515 (holding hospital and physicians immune
under state-action doctrine in action concerning denial of hospital staff privileges); Uniforce
Temp. Personnel,87 F.3d 1296 (holding workers' compensation insurers immune under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act); TEC CogenerationInc., 76 F.3d 1560 (holding electric utility
immune under state-action and Noerr.Penningtondoctrines).
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defendants continued their dominance on appeal, prevailing in all but
one action.'
I. SURVEY
A. Government-Related Immunities: The State-Action and NoerrPennington Doctrines
1. Summary of the Law. The Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions
in 1996 involving government-related immunities, specifically the stateaction and Noerr-Penningtondoctrines. These immunity doctrines, at
their core, are based upon the identity of the source of the alleged injury
to competition:
If the injury is caused by persuading the government, then the
antitrust laws do not apply to the squelching (Parkerv. Brown [stateaction immunity]) or the persuasion (Noerr-Pennington). If the injury

flows directly from the "petitioning"-if the injury occurs no matter
how the government responds to the request for aid-then we have an
antitrust case.6

The state-action doctrine immunizes states from federal antitrust law
for their actions as sovereigns.' This doctrine similarly protects political
subdivisions of a state that act pursuant to a "'clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed'" state policy to replace competition with
regulation.'
Private conduct also may benefit from state-action
immunity if, in addition to being undertaken pursuant to a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to replace competition with regulation, it is "actively supervised" by the state.'

5. Aquatherm Indus., 84 F.3d 1388 (reversing dismissal on res judicata grounds and
remanding for further proceedings).
6. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,376 (7th
Cir. 1987). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 20.7, at 689
(1994).
7. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see also infra note 62. Such immunity "does
not mean.., that the States may exempt private action from the scope of the Sherman

Act." City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991).
8. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985) (quoting City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
9. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafeyette, 435 U.S. at 410). The "active supervision" requirement
does not apply to political subdivisions because there is less danger, as compared with

private parties, that a political subdivision will act to further its own interest through
anticompetitive arrangements. Town of Hallie,471 U.S. at 47.
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The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a logical "corollary" to the stateaction immunity doctrine.10 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine generally
immunizes from antitrust liability private persons and entities who,
unilaterally or collectively, petition the government for legislation or
other favorable action." "[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private
action,' those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity
from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint."" Moreover,
even where the restraint results directly from private action, immunity
exists if the restraint is "Incidental' to a valid effort to influence
governmental action.""
2. The Eleventh Circuit Decisions. In Crosby v. Hospital
Authority of Valdosta & Lowndes County,'4 the Eleventh Circuit
considered application of the state-action doctrine to a denial of hospital
staff privileges. Plaintiff, Dr. Crosby, applied for staff privileges at the
Georgia Medical Center, a hospital owned and operated by the defendant
hospital authority." After review by several committees of the medical
staff of the Center and the appellate review committee of the hospital
authority, plaintiff's application was denied on the ground that he failed
to. meet the criteria (i.e., training, experience, and performance) for
privileges established by the hospital authority's bylaws.' 6 The hospital
authority's appellate review committee conducted hearings concerning
Dr. Crosby's application, examined it in light of the recommendations of
the various staff committees, and affirmed the denial of staff privileges.17 Dr. Crosby then brought suit contending that the hospital
authority and the doctors who served on the peer review committees that
made the recommendations on his application conspired to deprive him
of staff privileges in violation of federal antitrust law.' The district
court held on summary judgment that all of the defendants were
immune from liability under the state-action doctrine. 9 The district

10. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 379.
11. See Eastern R.R. President Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

12.

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,499 (1988) (quoting

Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143).
93 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1519-20.
Id.
Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1521.
Crosby v. Hospital Auth., 873 F. Supp. 1568, 1580-81 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
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court further held, alternatively, that defendants were immune from
damages under the Local Government Antitrust Act."
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.2 The court first grappled with
whether the hospital authority is a political subdivision of Georgia or a
private actor. The Georgia statute that created the hospital authority
provides that such authorities are public bodies.'
The Georgia
Supreme Court has held, however, that hospital authorities created
under Georgia law are not political subdivisions of the state for
sovereign immunity purposes.23 Despite this state precedent, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the hospital authority is a "political
subdivision" for purposes of state-action immunity under federal
antitrust law." The court explained that
the definition of "political subdivisions" for purposes of state sovereign
immunity does not control its definition for purposes of antitrust state
action immunity ....
Wie focus instead on whether the nexus
between the State and the [hospital authority] is sufficiently strong
that there is little real danger that the [hospital authority] is involved
in a private price-fixing arrangement.2
The court concluded that the nature and purpose of the hospital
authority under Georgia law warranted treating the hospital authority
as a political subdivision of Georgia
for purposes of state-action
26
immunity under federal antitrust law.

The Eleventh Circuit next considered whether the physician members
of the peer review committees also could take advantage of state-action
immunity. The court first noted that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit
precedent, staff physicians and their hospital are viewed as separate
economic actors capable of conspiring in violation of Section 1 of the

20. Id. at 1581-84. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(1994), bars antitrust damage actions against local governments. The act also precludes
the recovery of damages from any local government official or employee "acting in an
official capacity." 15 U.S.C. § 36(a) (1994). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district

court's holding that plaintiff's damage claims were barred by the Local Government
Antitrust Act. Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1535-37.
21. 93 F.3d at 1537.
22. O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72 to -75 (1996).
23. Thomas v. Hospital Auth., 264 Ga. 40, 41, 440 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1994).
24. Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1525.
25. Id. at 1524 (citing Town of Haille, 471 U.S. at 46-47).
26. Id at 1524-25. The court also concluded that the hospital authority's board
members were entitled to the state-action protection afforded a political subdivision. Id.
at 1526.
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Sherman Act.27 Nonetheless, the court held that the staff physicians
were "agents" of the hospital authority for state-action immunity
purposes 'because the challenged conduct "consisted exclusively of official
actions taken as members of the hospital's peer review committees."28
The court reasoned that
the fact that a hospital and its staff are separate economic [actors] or
legal entities does not mean that a staff physician cannot be the agent
of a hospital for certain purposes and in certain circumstances .... In
short, a hospital and its staff can be separate entities for purposes of
intraenterprise immunity, but the staff physicians may in certain
contexts be agents of the hospital for purposes of state action immunity.m

Because the hospital authority had the ultimate decision making
power and exercised plenary review over all credentialing decisions, the
court concluded that there was little or no danger of a private pricefixing arrangement between the peer-review physicians and the hospital
authority as to credentialing. 0 Accordingly, the court held that the
individual peer review committee members were agents of the hospital
authority and, like the hospital authority, did not have to show that
their actions were actively supervised by the state to qualify for stateaction immunity.8 In finding that the physicians were agents of the
hospital authority for credentialing, the court essentially demonstrated
that their challenged activities were actively supervised by the state
through the hospital authority. Thus, the court's result is sound.
Finally, the court held that the hospital authority and its agents were
acting pursuant to clearly articulated state policy in denying plaintiff's
application for staff privileges.3 2 Indeed, after reviewing the Georgia
statute delineating the hospital authority's powers, the court held that
[Tihe statute
the "clear articulation question is not a close one ....
explicitly provides for precisely the anticompetitive conduct about which

27. Id. at 1526-29 (discussing Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.
1990) ("Bolt II") and Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Bolt IMI and Todorou both held that the intra-enterprise doctrine of Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984)--which holds that the actions of a
single enterprise do not constitute the type of concerted action proscribed by Section 1 of
the Sherman Act-generally does not apply to physicians and their hospitals because they

are separate economic entities. Bolt III, 891 P.2d at 819; Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1446.
28. Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1530.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

1529.
1530.
1531-32.
1534.
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[plaintiff] complains.""3 Accordingly, the court held that defendants
were immune from plaintiffrs antitrust claims.3 '
TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. 5 involved
application of the state-action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines to the
electric utility industry in Florida. Plaintiffs were engaged in the
business of developing cogeneration projects and supplying turbines and
services for use in cogeneration projects." Plaintiffs successfully bid
to construct and service a large cogeneration facility in Metropolitan
Dade County, Florida ("Dade") for purposes of supplying electrical and
thermal power to a new Miami government center. The contract allowed
plaintiffs to dispense any excess power to Dade facilities outside of the
new government center."7 The cogeneration facility became fully
operational in late 1 9 8 6 .' Because of the substantial surplus of
unused generating capacity, the cogeneration facility quickly became
unprofitable.3 '
To reduce their losses, plaintiffs sought a logical use for the excess
power-plaintiffs asked defendant Florida Power & Light Company
("FPLV' to wheel their surplus power to other Dade facilities, most
notably to a Dade hospital complex. 4" Believing that plaintiffs' request
would violate the Florida Public Service Commission's ("PSC") selfservice wheeling rules, FPL declined to wheel.'2 Plaintiffs then
directed Dade, pursuant to the terms of the contract, to petition the PSC
for an order compelling FPL to wheel.' Following a lengthy administrative proceeding, the PSC denied Dade's petition." Finally, plaintiffs
and Dade sought approval from the Dade County Board of Commissioners ("Commission") to construct a separate transmission line from the

33. Id.
34.

Id.

35. 76 F.3d 1560, modified on reh'g, 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996).
36. Id. at 1564. Cogeneration is the production of electricity and useful thermal energy
at a single facility. Id. at 1564 n.2.
37. Id. at 1565.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1566.
40. FPL is an investor-owned public electrical utility that generates, transmits,
distributes, and sells electric energy in southern and eastern Florida, including most of
Dade County. Id. at 1564-65. FPL has monopoly power in its service area as to both the
purchase and sale of electric power. Id. at 1565.
41. Id. at 1566. "Wheeling" electric power means to transfer electric power from one
utility to another over the facilities of an intermediate utility. Id. at 1564 n.3.
42. Id. at 1566.
43. Id.
44. Id.

1997]

ANTITRUST

1395

Plaintiffs
Miami government center to a Dade hospital facility.'
lobbied the Commission for its approval; FPL lobbied against." The
Commission voted against construction of the separate transmission
line.47
Within weeks, plaintiffs filed an antitrust action allegating that FPL
acted anticompetitively by: (1) refusing to wheel plaintiffs' excess power;
(2) manipulating its rate structure to the detriment of cogenerators and
their customers; and (3) interfering with interconnection between FPL's
system and the Miami government center." Following discovery, the
district court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding
that state-action and Noerr-Pennington immunity were unavailable
because FPL acted solely in its economic self-interest without active
supervision by the state.49 Holding that denial of a defendant's motion
for summary judgment under the state-action doctrine is immediately
appealable as a collateral order, and alternatively granting permission
to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),60 the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the district court's order and reversed."1
The court of appeals first addressed the state-action immunity issue.
The court held that Florida "has an obvious and clearly articulated
policy to displace competition with regulation in the area of power
generation and transmission and that FPL's conduct has been performed
pursuant to that policy. 52 In light of pervasive Florida regulation
through statute and regulatory rules, this holding is surely correct."
Because FPL is a private party, the court next considered whether
Florida actively supervised FPL. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the
district court's ruling that there was no active supervision because the
PSC, although it had the power to supervise FPL, had no opportunity to
exercise such power during the early stages of FPL's allegedly unlawful
acts." Initially, the Eleventh Circuit held that whether the PSC had

45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id. at 1566-67.
48. Id. at 1567.
49. Id.
50. ld at 1563 n.1. The court did not address whether denial of defendant's summary
judgment motion based on Noerr-Penningtonimmunity justified immediate review. There
does not appear to be any reason to distinguish between the state-action and NoerrPennington doctrines for appellate jurisdictional purposes.
51. Id. at 1573.
52. Id. at 1568.
53. I (citing FLA. STAT. J§ 366.04(1), (5), .05(1), .06(1), .051 (1994); FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 25-17.080 to .091 (1988)).
54. I&
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this threshold opportunity to exercise control was irrelevant; the issue,
according to the court, was whether the PSC had the power to exercise
supervision "when called upon to do so."' Apparently recognizing that
its reasoning conflicted with Supreme Court precedent holding that the
"mere potential for state supervision" does not establish active supervision by a state," the Eleventh Circuit subsequently modified its
original decision.5" In place of its initial analysis, the court added three
new paragraphs detailing the "active and substantial role" the PSC
actually played in supervising FPL's wheeling, rate setting, and
interconnection activities." The court held that FPL's actions bore "the
affirmative and ongoing imprimatur of the state," thus satisfying the
active supervision requirement."9 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
held that FPL's conduct in wheeling, rate setting, and interconnection
was immune from antitrust liability.'
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed application of the NoerrPennington doctrine in considering whether FPL's lobbying of the
Commission to vote against construction of plaintiffs' proposed transmisThe district
sion line was immune from antitrust liability.8 '
court-misapplying a so-called "commercial exception' -had rejected
FPL's immunity argument because FPL's conduct was for economic
rather than political reasons." The Eleventh Circuit, without deciding
whether a "commercial exception" exists, rejected the district court's
ruling." The court explained that Noerr-Pennington immunity turns

55. Id. at 1570.
56. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 622 (1992).
57. TEC Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996)
(granting petition for rehearing in part).
58. Id. at 1029.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 76 F.3d at 1570-73.
62. The Supreme Court has left open the possibility of an exception to the state-action
immunity doctrine where the government acts "as a commercial participant in a given
market." City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 374-75. This might suggest that a similar
commercial exception applies to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine where the government-not
simply the lobbyist-is acting as a commercial participant in the market. Some courts
have held that such an exception exists. See, e.g., Israel v. Baxter Labs, 466 F.2d 272, 27577 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 850 (1970). Other courts have rejected such an exception. See, e.g., Greenwood Utils.
Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1505 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Airport Car
Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 1133 (1983).
63. TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1572.

64. Id.
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on "the conduct, not the intent or motivation behind the conduct.E s
This comports with the Supreme Court's observation that "Noerrshields
from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose.'
Thus, regardless of whether FPL's
lobbying was intended solely to further its commercial self-interest--as
naturally would be expected from a rational market participant--the
court correctly held that FPL was immune from antitrust liability.'7
B. Antitrust Protection for the Insurance Industry
1. Summary of the Law. In 1945, Congress enacted the McCarranFerguson Act," pursuant to which Congress delegated to the states the
power to regulate and tax the business of insurance.' The McCarranFerguson Act exempts from federal antitrust law the business of
insurance to the extent it is regulated by state law."0 The Supreme
Court has developed a three-part analysis to determine whether conduct
of insurance companies concerns the "business of insurance": (i) whether
the practice has the effect of spreading or transferring a policyholder's
risk; (ii) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (iii) whether the practice
is limited to entities within the insurance industry.71
Excluded from the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption are
agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate and acts of boycott, coercion,

65. Id. at 1573. One notable exception is that objectively baseless "sham" litigation
may fall outside of the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993).
66. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
67. TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1573.
68. Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20, §§ 1-5,59 Stat. 33-34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15
(1994)).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994). Before the adoption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
and indeed even prior to the adoption of the Sherman Act, the domestic insurance industry
operated on the belief that it was not subject to regulation by Congress. This belief was
based largely on Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868), in which the Supreme Court
held that the business of insurance involved "local transactions... governed by the local
law." In 1944, however, the Supreme Court held that the insurance industry was within
the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, and upheld a Sherman Act
indictment charging that a large group of insurance companies had conspired through a
rating organization to fix fire insurance premiums and eliminate competition. United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Congress enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in reaction to this decision.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12.
71. See Union Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co.
v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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or intimidation. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California," the
Supreme Court explained that a "boycott" for McCarran-Ferguson Act
purposes means more than just "an absolute refusal to deal on any
terms."
A boycott under the McCarran-Ferguson Act occurs when
parties refuse to engage in collateral transactions with a target in order
to coerce the target into certain terms on a primary transaction. '
2. The Eleventh Circuit Decisions. Two Eleventh Circuit cases
in 1996 concerned application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In
Uniforce Temporary Personnel,Inc. v. NationalCouncil on Compensation
Insurance, Inc.," a temporary employment company brought suit
against insurance companies, reinsurers, and a workers' compensation
insurers' association alleging violations of Section 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. Plaintiff, which was required to provide workers'
compensation insurance for the temporary employees it placed, only
qualified for workers' compensation from the most expensive market, the
residual or assigned risk insurance market."6 Upset because it was
forced to pay high insurance premiums, plaintiff brought an antitrust
suit that alleged price fixing and that defendants' business practices in
the workers' compensation insurance market-specifically defendants'
rate-making, classification, and allocation of risk-limited competition
in the temporary help industry through their administration of workers'
compensation insurance.77 Defendants moved for summary judgment,
contending that the McCarran-Ferguson Act insulated the conduct at
issue from antitrust liability and, alternatively, that plaintiff failed to
state a viable Sherman Act claim.7" The district court granted summary judgment on all claims.'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal." The court held that
defendants' rate-making activity constituted the business of insurance.8 ' Moreover, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that defendants' conduct fell within the boycott exception to the McCarranFerguson Act because plaintiff did not allege that defendants had

72. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
73. Id. at 801.
74. Id. at 802-03.
75. 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996).

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id at 1298.
Id.
I&
Uniforce Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc.,

892 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1995), affd, 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996).
80. 87 F.3d at 1301.

81. Id at 1300.
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refused to deal with plaintiff in a collateral transaction--such as the
purchase of health insurance-in an effort to coerce the terms of its
purchase of workers' compensation insurance."2 Thus, in relatively
short order, the court held that the district court properly dismissed
plaintiff's claims on summary judgment."
In Slagle v. ITT Hartford,"'the Eleventh Circuit again considered
the application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Plaintiff, a consumer of
windstorm insurance in Florida, brought an antitrust action against
insurance companies licensed to transact business in Florida and
members of the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association ("FWUA7)." The FWUA is a joint underwriting association of Florida
property insurers that was created by the Florida Legislature in
response to the inability of the voluntary insurance market to provide
windstorm-only insurance in Florida's high-risk coastal areas."c Florida
law mandates that property insurers in Florida belong to the FWUA and
provide windstorm coverage to eligible applicants who are unable to
obtain such coverage through ordinary means.8 7 Plaintiff alleged that
defendants conspired to refuse to issue windstorm insurance in the open
market for certain Florida coastal areas, thereby allowing defendants to
use the FWUA to maintain artificial prices for the insurance,"
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act protected the activity at issue."9 The district
court granted defendants' motion."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit easily concluded that the conduct at
issue involved the business of insurance." The court likewise rejected
plaintiffs' contention that the boycott exception to the McCarran-

82. Id.
83. Id. at 1301. Alternatively, the court held that plaintiff failed to state a Sherman
Act claim because plaintiff did not compete in the same market as defendants and plaintiff
could not demonstrate a competitive relationship between the markets in which plaintiff
and defendants respectively compete. Id. In other words, plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that the alleged restraint in the market for providing workers' compensation insurance had
a detrimental effect on competition in the market for temporary help. Strangely, plaintiff
failed to allege any anticompetitive impact in the market for workers' compensation
insurance even though plaintiff was a direct purchaser.
84. 102 F.3d 494 (11th Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 495.
86. Id. at 496.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 497.
90. Slagle v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 904 F. Supp. 1346, 1347 (N.D. Fla. 1995), affd,
102 F.3d 494 (11th Cir. 1996).
91. 102 F.3d at 499.

1400

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Ferguson Act applied.' The court explained that plaintiffs' allegation
of "a conspiracy to charge an inflated price is not a 'boycott'" for
McCarran-Ferguson Act purposes.9" Because plaintiffs failed to allege
that defendants were using "'unrelated transactions... as leverage to
achieve the terms desired'" in the primary transaction, the court
determined that the boycott exception did not apply. 4 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's
claims.9
C. Levine v. CentralFloridaMedical Affiliates"
Levine was the only Eleventh Circuit case last year decided on the
merits, as opposed to procedural or immunity grounds. Plaintiff, a
physician specializing in internal medicine, had sought to join defendants Healthchoice, a preferred provider organization ("PPO") with a
limited panel of providers offering health care coverage in the Orlando
area, and the Central Florida Medical Affiliates ("CFMA"), a physician
advocacy group whose members were required to be Healthchoice
provider panel members. 7 Dr. Levine was denied membership by
Healthchoice because it already had enough internists to serve its
patient population." Thereafter, Dr. Levine's privileges were suspended based on patient care concerns at a hospital owned and operated by
the ultimate parent of.Healthchoice."
Dr. Levine brought suit alleging violations of Section 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, as well as various state law violations. 1 ° Dr. Levine
alleged that Healthchoice, CFMA, and CFMA's member physicians
conspired to restrain trade unreasonably by restricting the availability
of and competition among health care providers for Healthchoice
patients in the Orlando area. Dr. Levine also alleged that the hospital,
its parent, and other unnamed coconspirators agreed to restrain trade
unreasonably by suspending his staff privileges. Dr. Levine's Section 2
claim was based on CFMAs monopolization, attempt to monopolize, or
conspiracy with Healthchoice and the other defendants to monopolize the
market for physician medical services to Healthchoice enrollees in the

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 499 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 802 (1993)).
Id. (quoting Hartford FireIns. Co., 509 U.S. at 803).
Id.
72 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1541.
Id. at 1543.
Id.
Id. at 1544.
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Orlando area.'"' The district court granted summary judgment on all
of the antitrust claims, principally for lack of antitrust standing."°
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 3 The court of appeals
initially held that it would not reach the issue of antitrust standing."a°
Foreshadowing its ruling, the court explained that because Dr. Levine
had failed to establish any anticompetitive effect resulting from the
challenged restraints, he had failed to show an antitrust violation on the
merits.0" Thus, it was unnecessary to presume the existence of an
antitrust violation to test plaintiff's standing. In doing so, the court
properly distinguished between the failure to prove an antitrust violation
and failure to establish standing to prosecute the antitrust violation.
The court of appeals first addressed the conspiracy claim against
Healthchoice, CFMA, and CFMA's member physicians. For starters, the
court rejected the notion that the agreement was per se unlawful as a
The court explained that Healthchoice
price-fixing conspiracy.'
negotiated provider reimbursement schedules directly with payers, not
with providers. 7 Healthchoice providers then had to choose unilaterally between accepting the fee negotiated by Healthchoice, with the
freedom to accept less, or dropping out of the plan."~ This, concluded
the court, is "a kind of 'price fixing,' but it is a kind that the antitrust
laws do not prohibit" because no agreement among Healthchoice,
9 CFMA,
or CFMNs member doctors fixed the prices consumers pay.1
The court then considered whether the agreements among Healthchoice, CFMA, and the member providers to restrict the size of the
provider panel and to discourage providers from referring Healthchoice
enrollees to non-Healthchoice physicians were unreasonable restraints

101. Id. at 1555.
102. Levine v. Central Florida Med. Affiliates, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1175 (M.D. Fla. 1994),
affd, 72 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 75 (1996).
103. 72 F.3d at 1556.
104. Id. at 1545.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1549.
107. Id. at 1546-48. The court's opinion suggests that Healthchoice was negotiating
with payers solely in its own behalf, not for the benefit of its physicians. Thus, despite the
lack of shared risk among the physicians, their multiprovider network likely would satisfy
the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's Statements ofAntitrust Policy
in Health Care. Statements of Antitrust Policy in Health Care (DOJ & FTC, Aug. 28,
1996), 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1295 (1996). If, however, Healthchoice was negotiating with
payers on behalf of its physicians, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have stated that, in their view, the arrangement would amount to a per se
unlawful price agreement. Id. at 1317 (Statement 9).
108. 72 F.3d at 1546-48.
109. Id. at 1548.
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of trade. Although plaintiff urged that these agreements evidenced a per
se unlawful group boycott, the court wisely declined to accept plaintiff's
characterization and instead measured the challenged restraints by the
rule of reason.11 The court first considered whether Dr. Levine had
demonstrated actual detrimental effects, explaining that such proof
would obviate the need for establishing market power, which merely
serves as a proxy for inferring anticompetitive effects.'
The court
concluded that Dr. Levine failed to show actual anticompetitive
effects." 2 The court's analysis is marred by the failure to define the
relevant market in which to evaluate the actual effects of the challenged
restraints and the emphasis on Dr. Levine's business success,"' which
evidences, but hardly compels, the conclusion that competition was not
harmed by the restraints." 4 Nonetheless, despite these flaws, the lack
of record evidence of increased prices or reduced output appears to
confirm the court's holding of the lack of a jury issue as to actual
anticompetitive effects.
Next, the court considered whether proof of defendants' intent to harm
competition substitutes for proof of market, power. The court rejected
this suggestion, explaining that "[tihe rule of reason analysis is
concerned with the actual or likely effects of defendants' behavior, not
with the intent behind the behavior."I" Thus, the court held that
"even if Dr. Levine had established that the defendants intended to
restrict competition-which he has not-proof of such intent would not
relieve him of the necessity of either proving the defendants' market
power or proving an actual detrimental effect on competition."""
Finally, as to the Section 1 claim against Healthchoice, CFMA, and the
member providers, the court analyzed whether the record created a
material fact dispute about defendants' power to control price or output.
Plaintiff contended that defendants possessed market power in the
market for the provision of internist services to Healthchoice patients by
Healthchoice panel physicians in the Orlando area. The court rejected

110. Id. at 1549-50. The court reached this decision because courts do not have
significant experience in evaluating restraints by multiprovider health care networks and
because defendants lack market power.
111. Id. at 1551-52.
112. Id.
113. The record showed that Dr. Levine's pretax earnings in 1990 were $553,176, and
in 1991 rose to $724,722. Id. at 1542-44.
114. Id. at 1551-53. The court discussed market definition in the context of analyzing
market power. I& at 1552-53.
115. Id. Cf Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (holding that

attempt to monopolize claims requires more than proof of predatory intent).
116. 72 F.3d at 1552.
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this narrow market definition because it improperly excluded from the
market non-Healthchoice panel physicians to whom Healthchoice
patients could turn for partially reimbursed services."' The court
rejected plaintiff's contention that non-Healthchoice physicians were an
economically impractical substitute for Healthchoice patients because of
the lack of evidence showing either the cost for Healthchoice patients to
use nonplan physicians versus plan physicians or the cost for Healthchoice patients to join a competing plan. 8 The court did not discuss
the propriety of limiting the market solely to Healthchoice patients,
which seems questionable without evidence that Healthchoice dominated
the market for health provider plans in Orlando. Based on the record,
the court of appeals properly held that plaintiff failed to define a
9
relevant market in which defendants had market power,"
The court next addressed the Section 1 claim against the hospital, its
parent, and unnamed members of the hospital's medical staff based on
Dr. Levine's denial of staff privileges. Analyzing the restraint under the
rule of reason, the court again held that plaintiff failed to show an
anticompetitive effect on competition.' ° The court explained that the
mere denial of privileges to a single physician, especially when the
physician maintained privileges at several other local hospitals, failed
to establish harm to competition and consumers generally.12 Because
Dr. Levine had declined to introduce evidence to demonstrate market
power as to these defendants as an alternative to proof of actual
anticompetitive effect, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
on this claim. 2 2
Finally, the court considered Dr. Levine's Section 2 monopolization
claims. As with Dr. Levine's other antitrust claims, the court held that
the failure to introduce sufficient facts to define the relevant market,
and hence show that defendants possessed the necessary economic
power-here, monopoly power-doomed plaintiff's claims.' 23 Moreover,
the court held that Dr. Levine failed to show any evidence that

117. Id. at 1552-53.
118. Id. at 1553. In fact, Dr. Levine apparently treated Healthchoice plan patients,
undermining his argument. Id.
119. Id. Alternatively, the court held that even if the market were defined properly,
plaintiff had failed to present evidence of market power. Id. This alternative conclusion
is dubious in that the narrowly defined market suggested by plaintiff established, by
definition, the market power of Healthchoice and its plan internists. Indeed, this is likely
why plaintiff offered such a narrowly defined market in the first place.
120. Id. at 1555.
121. Id. at 1554.
122. Id. at 1555.
123. Id. at 1556.
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defendants specifically intended to monopolize the relevant market-an
essential element of any attempt to monopolize claim.124 Thus, the
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment as to the Section 2
claims as well."2
II. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's relatively busy antitrust workload in 1996
offers little encouragement to the private antitrust bar. To the contrary,
the 1996 antitrust docket confirms that antitrust plaintiffs in the
Eleventh Circuit are hard-pressed just to get past a dispositive motion,
let alone to recover on their claims. This trend is not likely to change,
and could even be accelerated if, as we anticipate, the Supreme Court
this term removes vertically imposed maximum resale prices from the
ever-narrowing category of per se illegal antitrust offenses. 2 "

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Kahn v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
941 (1997).

